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Abstract
The notion of a physiological individuals has been developed and applied in the phi-
losophy of biology to understand symbiosis, an understanding of which is key to
theorising about the major transition in evolution from multi-organismality to multi-
cellularity. The paper begins by asking what such symbiotic individuals can help
to reveal about a possible transition in the evolution of cognition. Such a transition
marks the movement from cooperating individual biological cognizers to a function-
ally integrated cognizing unit. Somewhere along the way, did such cognizing units
simultaneously have cognizers as parts? Expanding upon the multiscale integration
view of the Free Energy Principle, this paper develops an account of reciprocal inte-
gration, demonstrating how some coupled biological cognizing systems, when certain
constraints are met, can result in a cognizing unit that is in ways greater than the
sum of its cognizing parts. Symbiosis between V. Fischeri bacteria and the bobtail
squid is used to provide an illustration this account. A novel manner of conceptual-
izing biological cognizers as gradient is then suggested. Lastly it is argued that the
reason why the notion of ontologically nested cognizers may be unintuitive stems
from the fact that our folk-psychology notion of what a cognizer is has been deeply
influenced by our folk-biological manner of understanding biological individuals as
units of reproduction.
Keywords Free energy principle · Active inference · Symbiosis · Nested Markov
blankets ·Multiscale integration · Cognitive evolution · Emergence · Physiological
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1 Introduction
Symbioses1 are cooperative heterospecific associations in which each symbiont part-
ner mutually benefits from (e.g., gaining nourishment, shelter, etc.) the presence of
the other partner(s). These associations have presented an interesting problem case for
the notion of biological individuality. What it is to be a biological individual refers
to what it is that makes a living system a well delineated whole. Symbiosis raises
the ontological question of whether beyond classifying each symbiont as a biological
individual, there is a non-arbitrary manner of classifying the symbiotic assemblage
itself as a well delineated biological unit. And if so, how can this non-arbitrary man-
ner be spelled out? Answering this question is particularly important for at least two
reasons; the first being that symbiosis is ubiquitous in nature; getting clear on the
conditions under which a symbiotic association qualifies as a countable biological
individual allows biological explanations to parse the world up in ways that ontolog-
ically cohere with the kinds of entities that populate the world. The second reason is
that conceptualizing symbiotic associations as well delineated biological units plays a
significant role in coming to understanding (and offer explanations of) the move from
multi-organismality to multicellularity, an example of what has been called a major
transition in evolution (Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995). Under the assumption
that multicellular organisms evolved from multi-organismal ensembles and that some
of these ensembles were likely symbiotic associations, understanding this major tran-
sition in evolution requires a way to conceptualize biological individuals that is not
restricted to units of reproduction or what are otherwise known as “Darwinian indi-
viduals” (see Godfrey-Smith 2013).
One way that philosophers have recently addressed this question is by conceptually
developing and applying the notion of a physiological individual.Abiological individ-
ual of this kind is a highly integrated functional unit, the heterogeneous parts of which
cohere together through regulatory processes (e.g., metabolic, immuno-tolerance, etc.)
so as to maintain the system’s integrity and resist environmental forces of decay
(Pradeu 2011). Applying the notion of a physiological individual to symbioses sug-
gests that at least some symbiotic ensembles qualify as biological individuals in their
own right (Queller and Strassman 2009; Pradeu 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2013; Bouchard
2018). What qualifies some of these ensembles as physiological individuals is the
high degree to which the symbionts are functionally integrated with one another. A
fascinating and somewhat counterintuitive result of parsing biological world up in this
manner is a kind of nesting of biological individuals in biological individuals; not only
are the symbionts understood to be physiological individuals but also the symbiotic
association comprised of those symbionts qualifies as a physiological individual.
This paper examines a related interesting question for any biologically informed
cognitive science that takes two ideas seriously. Thefirst idea is that cognitive processes
are an enrichment of the organizational principles and properties definitive of living
processes or what is called “the strong life-mind continuity thesis” (Godfrey-Smith
1996). The continuity thesis suggests that mind, because it is an enrichment of life,
1 Throughout this paper, I will use the term symbiosis to refer specifically to mutualistic associations and
not commensalism or parasitism.
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might be exhibited in biological processes that prefigure those which cognitive science
typically studies. It opens up the possibility that simple organisms (e.g., some bacteria
and plants)may engage in cognitive processes that are not different in kind but different
in degree to those processes that are paradigmatic of human cognition. The second idea
is that some symbiotic associations actually do qualify as physiological individuals.
Putting these ideas together the followingquestion arises: ifmind is an enriched version
of life and some symbiotic associations indeed qualify as physiological individuals,
is there any reason to think that some of these living associations might themselves
be enriched enough so as to qualify as bio-cognizers?2 This is not merely a question
regarding a possible application of the extendedmind thesis (i.e., the idea that cognitive
processes can loop outside of a cognizing agent to envelop the use of external artefacts
as scaffolding) (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Rather, this is a question about the kinds of
physiological individuals that we can reasonably ascribe the term “cognizer” to. It is
a question about how to count biological minds. The significance of this question lies
in the fact that its answer may be used to shed light upon a possible major transition
in cognition. Perhaps there are many such transitions: the move from reflex behaviour
to sensorimotor coordination; the move from non-sentience to sentience; the move
from individual intentionality to group intentionality. However the question which this
paper will investigate concerns the transition away from short-term, slightly integrated
cooperative interaction between simple cognizing physiological individuals towards
the long-term, highly integrated cooperative interaction of the component parts of a
complex cognizing symbiotic whole; each of the parts becoming more specialized in
the function it plays in driving the behaviour of the whole integrated system.
Given the major transition in evolution from multi-organismality to multicellular-
ity, and assuming that at least some of those component organisms that eventually
constituted multicellular organisms were cognizers, symbiosis provides an opportu-
nity to think about how an ensemble of minded physiological individuals became a
single physiological individual with one mind. Like the nested-ness of physiological
individuals, the possibility of a symbiotic mind suggests that a symbiotic cognizing
unit may be comprised of nested symbiont cognizers. And much like the nested-ness
of physiological individuals runs counter to our folk-biological conception of biologi-
cal individuality, this idea that cognizers can have other cognizers as constituent parts
seems to go against the grain of our folk-psychological conception of what cognizers
are. One aim of this paper is to argue that the possibility of symbiotic minds provides
a reason to believe that our folk-psychological conception of “cognizer” may be in
need of serious revamping in this regard.
To support the notion of symbiotic minds and the notion of nested biological cog-
nizers that falls out of it, this paper will develop and deploy the notion of reciprocal
multiscale integration from within the Free Energy Principle. Reciprocal multiscale
integration describes the case where each of two (or more) cognizing systems uses
the other to provide evidence for its own model of the world (and itself acting in that
world). It is when each cognizer reciprocally contributes to the cognitive processes of
the other that an emergent action capacity arises. This is a capacity to act upon the envi-
2 This paper’s scope will be strictly limited to investigating biological cognizers or what I will often call
“bio-cognizers”.
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ronment which outstrips the individual action capacities of each partner; the capacity
of the whole being more than that possessed by the sum of its parts. It is this emergent
action capacity that allows a symbiotic unit to provide evidence for its own model of
the world and hence for its own continued existence. Reciprocal multiscale integration
builds upon the multiscale integrationist view of the Free Energy Principle (Ramstead
et al. 2019a, b; Hesp et al. 2019). This view uses the notion of nested Markov blankets
to demonstrate that cognitive systems have a plurality of ontological boundaries, each
relevant to the study of cognition. Reciprocal multiscale integration, on the other hand,
is amanner of accounting for the nested boundaries of cognizers as opposed to the inte-
grated boundaries of the nested non-cognizing constituents of cognitive systems. Like
the multiscale integration view, reciprocal multiscale integration deploys the Markov
blanket formalism ontologically. As it will be discussed in Sect. 2, the Free Energy
Principle (FEP) (Friston 2010, 2013) is a framework that sees both life and cognition
as coming about in virtue of minimizing the quantity variational free energy (hence-
forth free energy). The reason for using FEP to investigate and argue for a symbiotic
mind is not only because the quantity “free energy” provides a measure of cognition
across spatio-temporal scales (Ramstead et al. 2019a, b; Friston et al. 2015; Kirchhoff
and Kiverstein 2018), but because FEP and its various corollaries suggest a plausible
criterion for identifying biological cognizers across various spatio-temporal scales. In
other words, the theoretical apparatus that falls out of FEP may be used to arrive at
an account of the kind of enrichment of living processes that are required for those
processes to qualify as cognitive processes ascribable to physiological individuals;
thus, making good on the project of strong life-mind continuity.
As a case study in support of the notion of symbiotic minds I will look at the
symbiosis of Vibrio fischeri bacteria and the bobtail squid. I will argue that the Vibrio-
squid assemblage constitutes a functionally integrated cognitive whole, the Markov
blanket ofwhich constrains those of theVibrio and the squid. In showinghow the notion
of a symbiotic mind can be supported by reciprocal multiscale integration within FEP,
this paper contributes to the philosophy of cognitive science, demonstrating that our
folk-psychological conception of what cognizers are require rethinking. Moreover, if
the account of symbiotic cognizers presented is tenable, by bringing into relief and
accounting for at least one possible transition in cognition, this paper contributes to a
more complete understanding of the evolution of cognition.
This paper shall proceed as follows: In Sect. 2, after briefly reviewing FEP and
exposing its criterion for being a cognizer, adaptive active inference, I will explicate
the multiscale integrationalist approach as a manner of individuating the boundaries
of cognition. In Sect. 3 I will look at the symbiosis of Vibrio fischeri bacteria and the
bobtail squid before turning to some philosophical implications of this symbiosis that
are significant to thinking about symbiotic minds. In Sect. 4, building on themultiscale
integration view, I shall provide an account of reciprocal multiscale integration and
argue that some symbiotic associations and their symbiont constituents may be simul-
taneously construed as biological cognizers when reciprocally integrated. This paper
concludes when some brief remarks addressing the problem of nested-cognizers.
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2 The free energy principle—a short overview
The Free Energy Principle (FEP) (Friston 2010, 2013, 2019a, b), an ambitious unify-
ing cognitive framework that may be applied to any biological system, starts from a
particular view of life that is grounded in statistical physics. In nature, most systems
self-organize to thermodynamics equilibrium. This means that all energy gradients for
such systems have been consumed; something that entails death for living systems.
Staying alive on the other hand requires that the states of a system behave in ways
that counter the dissipative effects of random fluctuations. In other words, a biological
system is one that self-organizes to a limited set of attracting states that is far from
thermodynamic equilibrium (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977; Friston 2013). This set is
referred to as a system’s nonequilibrium steady state density (NESS) (Seifert 2012;
Friston 2019a, b; Friston et al. 2020; Palacios et. al. 2020). Importantly, the NESS den-
sity, towards which an organism’s dynamics flow, corresponds to its phenotype (i.e.,
its regular patterns of behaviour, morphology, and physiology), to find itself in its char-
acteristic or phenotypic states provides the organism is evidence that its behaviour is
countering dispersive effects of random fluctuations. Hence, for a biological system to
remain alive is for it to revisit the states defined by its NESS and to remain statistically
separate from the environment in which it is embedded. Statistical separation is cast
in terms of a conditional independence exhibited between the system’s internal states
and the external states of its environment. This brings us to the second primary feature
of FEP: the Markov blanket formalism.3
TheMarkov blanket formalism as used in the context of FEP and biological systems
describes a particular kind of statistical organization of a system relative to that which
the system is not. Namely, it describes the statistical partitioning of internal states
(r) and external states (ϕ) by sensory (s) and active states (a), these latter states
being the states of the Markov blanket. The behaviour of the internal states may be
predicted fully from knowing the states of theMarkov blanket and as such the external
states are rendered uninformative. Internal and external states are thus conditionally
independent. This conditional independence falls out of the partitioning rule: internal
states influence active states, which influence but are not influenced by external states;
external states influence sensory states, which influence but are not influenced by
internal states (Friston 2010). These dependencies/independencies do however allow
for like states to influence like (see Fig. 1).
Active and sensory states create a statistical partition between internal states of
system and external states of the environment, forming “a surface or boundary that
defines the thing that exists (e.g., a cellmembrane) (Friston 2019a, b, p. 176). Although
this conditional independency implies that the internal states remain statistically dis-
tinct from external states it should not however be taken to imply that such a system
3 The notion of a Markov blanket (Pearl 1988) was originally introduced in the context of graph theory,
where it describes a set of topological properties of a Bayesian nets. Specifically, a Markov blanket is the
smallest set of nodes in a larger set of nodes, which if given information regarding their states would allow
for the prediction of the unfolding states of a target node. This set of nodes includes parents, children and
co-parents. The conditional independence between the target node and the nodes outside its Markov blanket
mean that the latter are rendered uninformative or informationally redundant by the Markov blanket. The
description of this set of nodes in terms of active, and sensory states is specific to FEP and its corollary
active inference.
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Fig. 1 Markov blanket partitioning rule: sensory states (s) influence but cannot be influenced by internal
states (r). Active states (a) influence but cannot be influenced by external states (ϕ) This relation results
in a conditional independence of internal and external states, where if one knows s and a at time, t-1, the
knowledge of ϕ at time, t − 1, provides no additional information about the internal state at t
is causally isolated from the environment. Biological systems are self-organizing
thermodynamically open systems that operate far-from equilibrium. (Turner 1982).
The manner which biological systems resist dispersive effects of fluctuations in their
externalmilieu, and hence remain far from thermodynamic equilibrium, is by exchang-
ing matter and energy with their environment (Friston 2013; Demirel 2014). These
exchanges are mediated by a system’s Markov blanket via circular causality: external
states causally influence internal states by way of sensory state changes and inter-
nal states causally influence external states by way of active state changes. As such,
although the system individuated by its Markov blanket is statistically independent
from its environment, the formalism as used within FEP suggests that such systems
remain tightly coupled to the dynamics of the environment (Friston 2013, 2019a, b).
This brings us to a third essential feature of FEP: the notion of a generative model.
A generative model is a probabilistic model that describes how the evolution of
sensory states of a Markov blanket could be caused by external states; it captures
prior ‘beliefs’—in the form of probability distributions—about unobserved external
states, and a likelihoodmapping external states to the evolution of sensory states. Such
models are “implicit in the dynamics of internal states” (Palacios et al. 2020, p. 2).
Importantly, a system’s generative model may be cast in terms of its NESS. To see
how this is the case requires understanding the notion of dual information geometry
of self-organizing systems (Friston 2019a, b; Friston et al. 2020; Parr et al. 2019).
FEP describes the long-term dynamics of a self-organizing system in one of two
mathematically equivalent ways that depend upon such a system’s having a Markov
blanket and, hence, its existing at nonequilibrium steady state. The evolution of sys-
tem’s states (i.e., its flow) may be described dually in terms of (1) its phase space
dynamics or (2) its statistical manifold dynamics. With respect to its phase space
description, every instantaneous state of the system is represented by a point in phase
space (i.e., a space of all possible states that a system could occupy), every variable in
the system corresponds to a dimension of the phase space, and the evolution of states
over time corresponds to particular trajectory in phase space. Under this description,
the probabilistic flow of a system’s states over time is known as its intrinsic infor-
mation geometry (Friston et al. 2020). A system’s extrinsic information geometry
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describes the probabilistic flow of a system’s states over a statistical manifold, upon
which each manifold coordinate corresponds to the sufficient statistics (i.e., the mean
and the variance of a Gaussian) defining a probability density (i.e., a probabilistic
‘belief’ about external states). Adjacent points on a statistical manifold represent den-
sities that are alike, and the distance between points (i.e., “information length”) along
a manifold path scores distances between probability densities encoded as points on
that path respectively (Friston 2019a, b; Friston et al. 2020). In short, while intrinsic
information geometry is a description of the probabilistic evolution of states system
itself, extrinsic geometry is a description of ‘belief’ distributions over external states
that internal states of a Markov-blanketed system encode.
FEP suggest that as long as a system possess a Markov blanket, rendering the sys-
tem (i.e., its internal and active states) conditionally independent from its embedding
environment, the flow in phase space towards the NESS density can be expressed as a
probabilistic flow towards ‘belief’ distributions about external states. As a result, FEP
allows for the remarkable observation that the NESS density towards which any self-
organizing system tends to flow is that system’s generative model. Given the presence
of a system’s Markov blanket, its intrinsic and extrinsic geometries coincide, meaning
that a biological system’s phenotype dually corresponds to its NESS density and to its
generative model.4 How does a system’s generative model contribute to the continued
maintenance of its Markov blanket? This brings us to the fourth primary feature of
FEP: active inference.
Remaining alive (i.e., statically separate from the environment) is a continuous feat
that is accomplished despite the tendency for all systems to approach thermodynamic
equilibrium. As such, living systems appear to resist the second law of thermody-
namics. FEP proposes that living systems are able to do this in virtue of avoiding
sensory states which are deleterious and actively bringing about those sensory states
which allow them to maintain their structural and functional integrity. These latter
kinds of phenotypically determined sensory states describe those which an organism
expects itself to be in––given its generative model––and, as such, act as evidence for
its existence (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019b). This is just to say that an organism
must thus pursue those actions which bring about evidence for itself over the long run
(this includes exploration) and avoid those situations which could possibly result in
its systemic dissipation. How does an organism accomplish this?
The free-energy principle that states that for any biological system to remain alive,
it must minimize a quantity known as variational free energy. Variational free energy5
(henceforth, “free-energy”) is an upper bound on the information theoretic surprise6
(i.e., the negative log probability of sensory states) and is a function of probabilistic
4 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for callingmy attention to the importance of the phenotype’s
dual aspect.
5 Free energy is under some simplifying assumptions––the details of which I cannot treat in this paper––is
mathematically equivalent to the quantity “prediction error” (Friston 2010) that is typically referred to in
predictive processing. In what follows I shall use both free energy and prediction error to refer to the same
quantity unless noted otherwise.
6 Surprise (i.e., negativeBayesianmodel evidence) is itself a computationally intractable quantity because it
requires that biological systems have access to something that they generally do not have access to. Namely,
it requires access to all the possible ways in which sensory states could have been caused (Friston 2010).
Since free-energy is an upper bound on surprise (i.e., free-energy is always equal to or greater than surprise)
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‘beliefs’ encoded by internal states of a Markov-blanketed system. Free-energy may
be thought of as the difference between the sensory states an organism expects to
observe given its generative model (or equivalently, its NESS density) and those that it
actually observes at its sensorium. According to FEP, free-energy can beminimized by
(1) inferentially optimizing the internal states of the Markov blanket so as to accom-
modate sensory states (i.e., perception), and (2) inferentially optimizing active states
of the blanket (i.e., action) to sample sensory states that are expected given its pheno-
type. It is by engaging in this coupled process of active inference7 that an organism
minimizes not only current free energy encountered but expected free energy (i.e., the
free energy that would arise were a particular action policy selected and followed). It
should be impressed that the inference of active inference does not presuppose per-
sonal level inferential processes; rather, it describes the dynamics which underwrite
the optimization of internal states and prediction driven sensory feedback control.
Minimizing free energy over time is the same as maximizing Bayesian model evi-
dence (i.e., self-evidence) (Friston 2013; Hohwy 2016). This is because when an
organism’s generative model is well-tuned to its environment the discrepancy between
the kinds of states that the organism expects to observe (i.e., states that confirm its
own existence) and those that it does observe is at a minimum; its internal states may
be thus understood as a model of the external states of its niche (Friston et al. 2015). It
is thus by minimizing the free energy bound on surprise via active inference that bio-
logical systems “maximize the lower bound on the evidence for an implicit model of
how their sensory samples were generated” (Friston 2013, p. 2). An interesting result
of casting the NESS density as the generative model is that the gradient ascent of a
system towards its NESS density may be described “as if” that system is minimizing
variational free-energy and hence harvesting evidence for its generative model. To say
that a system will behave “as if” it is preforming a gradient descent on free-energy
is a description that falls out of the fact that there is a dual information geometry
(i.e., one can interpret a system’s gradient ascent on an attracting set through phase
space in terms of its flow towards a generative model on a statistical manifold). In
sum, to minimize free-energy is to maximize evidence for a generative model which
is just maximising evidence that the flow of the system’s internal and blanket states is
approaching its NESS density (i.e., flowing towards the system’s attracting states that
counter fluctuation effects).
2.1 Enriching life with autonomy—adaptive active inference
There are two important points about FEP that areworth noting. Firstly, FEP is not only
a theory of cognition but a theory of life; mind and life are both underwritten by the
same fundamental principle of free energy minimization and come about via the kind
ofMarkov blanket-preserving adaptive behaviour that is expressed by active inference.
FEP as such is ideally placed as a framework within which to investigate the notion of
Footnote 6 continued
and because it is something that biological systems do have access to (i.e., it is a function of a generative
model), it may be used as a proxy quantity for surprise. That is to say that by minimizing free-energy an
organism can minimize surprise and maximize model evidence.
7 It should be impressed that “inference” as it is used within FEP is understood as a subpersonal process.
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enrichment that is central to the strong life-mind continuity thesis. Moreover, because
FEP does not specify the manner in which active inference is physically implemented,
this framework may be used to theorize about cognition in a range of living systems
of varying complexity (see Auletta 2013; Calvo and Friston 2017; Kirchhoff 2018;
Sims 2019).
This brings us to the second point of importance. FEP falls short ofmaking the claim
that all Markov blankets draw a line around cognizers. It has been suggested that what
determines whether a living Markov blanketed system is cognizer is whether or not it
is the kind thing which engages in “adaptive active inference” rather than “mere active
inference” (Kirchhoff et al. 2018). Adaptive active inference requires that a system
autonomously engage in active inference, maximizing sensory evidence for its own
existence (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a, b). Autonomy may be understood as the
capacity for systemic self-evidencing through “actively monitor[ing] and react[ing]
to perturbations that challenge homeostatic variables” (Kirchhoff et al. 2018, p. 5).
Cells, tissues and organs, although they are self-organizing, free energy-minimizing
systems, fail to rise to the level of bio-cognitive individuals because the manner in
which they provide evidence for themselves (i.e. for their generative models) is highly
dependent upon the machinery of and their interaction with other components of a
global system (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019a). As such, FEP (or more specifically
its corollary adaptive active inference) boldly suggests that one manner in which life
may be enriched so as to rise to the status of mind is tied to the increased degree of
autonomy of the living Markov blanketed system.
The distinction between adaptive active inference and mere active inference offers
a manner of addressing a prima facie worry that active inference (and FEP more
generally) might be thought to face: ascribing Markov blankets to all living systems
is intuitively unattractive if it brings with it the claim that all living systems engage in
active inference. If something like a red blood cell actually engages in active inference,
then despite the fact that inferences are understood as subpersonal descriptions of
internal dynamics this result seems to make active inferential a trivial notion. This
trivialization worry however may be avoided when recognizing that although every
living thing is enshrouded by Markov blanket, this does not entail that every living
thing engaged in the kind of adaptive active inference that is required to be a cognizer.
In other words, one can understand theMarkov blanket formalism as a genuinemanner
of individuating all living systems (it is not merely way of modelling them)8 while
distinguishing the highly autonomousmanner inwhich bio-cognitive systemsmaintain
and preserve themselves and the highly interdependent manner that non-cognizing
living systems maintain and preserve one another. The distinction between adaptive
active inference and mere active inference demonstrates that active inference if fare
from a trivial notion—the devils in the detail.
To sum up: FEP (or more specifically its corollary adaptive active inference) boldly
suggests that one manner in which life may be enriched so as to rise to the status
of mind is tied to the increased degree of autonomy of the living Markov blanketed
8 That FEP holds Markov blankets to be ontologically robust may be supported by Friston when he writes
that a Markov blanket “is not some statistical device by which we come to observe or model the world—it
is a necessary attribute of a universe that can be carved into things (that are distinct from other things)”
(Friston 2019a, b, p. 176).
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system. With this understanding of FEP and adaptive active inference in hand, let us
now briefly look at the multiscale integration view, which lays much of the theoretical
ground upon which the notion of a symbiotic mind (and nested bio-cognizers) can be
developed.
2.2 Themultiscale integration
The multiscale integrationalist view (Ramstead et al. 2019a, b; Hesp et al. 2019) is a
pluralist theory about cognitive boundaries; it uses the notion of nested Markov blan-
kets to demonstrate that cognitive systems have a plurality of ontological boundaries,
each relevant to the study of cognition.9 Cognition is seen as falling out of active
inference that spans across and integrates various nested Markov blankets at differ-
ent spatio-temporal scales (Ramstead et al. 2019a, b). To support this position, the
multiscale integrationalist view offers a nuanced manner of spelling out just how the
boundaries of cognitive systems are both nested and multiple via the process of mul-
tiscale integration. Take for example a human cognitive system which is composed of
a brain; which is itself composed of cortical layers; which is composed of a collection
of neurons; which are composed of individual neurons, etc. According to the multi-
scale integrationalist view each of the spatio-temporally nested components of this
cognitive system may be ontologically picked out by deploying the Markov blanket
formalism at different scales. Any one Markov blanket located at one spatio-temporal
scale is simultaneously composed of other nested Markov blanket constituents at the
scale below and is itself a constituent of a larger Markov blanket at the scale above
it. The temporal dynamics between scales differ such that the smaller the scale is,
the faster the dynamics are. The slower dynamics of macroscale systems constrain
the faster dynamics of the microscale Markov blanketed systems, in effect acting as
an order parameter10 (Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Ramstead et al. 2019a, b). The structure
across scales is governed by the same conditional (in)dependencies described by the
partitioning rule (Allen and Friston 2018; Clark 2017; Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Ram-
stead et al. 2019a, b; Friston 2019a, b). Since free energy is an additive quantity, the
free energy which arises at the macroscale is the only free energy that there is for
the ensemble and it may be quantified by summing the free energy associated with
each constituent microscale Markov blanketed system. Minimizing free energy at the
level of the composite system thus means minimizing free energy at the level of the
constituent systems.
The process of multiscale integration may be generally understood in terms of
inferences made on the part of individual Markovian partitioned microscale compo-
nents (e.g. cells) of a macroscale system (e.g., a multicellular organism) that share
the same generative model (see Friston et al. 2015; Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Palacios
9 If the multiscale integrationalist view is correct, then cognition can be a spread-out endeavour, the kind
which often involves not only the brain but the dynamic and every-changing involvement of the body along
with aspects of the environment—a view that is consonant with 4E theories of cognition (Clark 2008;
Chemero 2009; Gallagher 2005).
10 An order parameter is a notion taken from synergetics (Haken 1985) and used dynamics systems theory. It
denotes a measure of a global system’s macroscale unstable (slow) dynamics that enslaves the fast dynamics
of microscale component systems and results in a globally emergent pattern.
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et al. 2020; Veissière et al. 2019). The idea of sharing a generative model may be
construed in two manners given what has been said above (Sect. 2) regarding the dual
information geometry of self-organizing Markov blanketed systems. When an organ-
ism’s phenotype is cast in terms of its generative model, all component particles of the
composite system will have the same expectations about the free-energy minimizing
sensory states that should be encountered in addition to the kind of active states which
are most likely to give rise to such sensory states. This means having the same of
priors (‘beliefs’) acquired via evolution (Palacios et al. 2020). Integration, from the
perspective of extrinsic information geometry, thus boils down to active inference on
the part of those component particles, each instantiating a generative model with the
same expectations as other integrating particles. The expected kinds of interaction
(sensory feedback) are constrained by the partitioning rule that governs the organiza-
tion of Markov blankets at any scale (e.g., If I infer that I am in an internal state of
a larger blanketed system, then I expect to be influenced by all other states with the
exception of external states). To minimize its free energy, and thus provide sensory
evidence for itself as a constituent of the larger system, a microscale system allows
itself to be enslaved to the dynamics of that macroscale system. The whole Markov
blanket ensemble is integrated in virtue of the free-energyminimizing, self-evidencing
dynamics occurring across/between each spatiotemporal scale (Ramstead et al. 2019a,
b), resulting in the emergence of a composite system that possesses a new generative
model at the superordinate level.
When taking the intrinsic perspective, where an organism’s phenotype is cast as its
NESS density, sharing a generative model may be seen as a case in which all of the
subordinate level Markov blanketed particles of a superordinate system self-organize
to a shared attracting set in phase space (i.e., a shared NESS density). From this
perspective, themechanics of themultiscale integration viewmay be understood as the
idea that any living system may have multiple NESS densities, nested in successively
larger spatio-temporal scales.11 Because aMarkov blanket in the case of living systems
statistically maps onto a system as defined by its NESS density, multiscale integration
can be understood as the idea that the coupled dynamics of multiple Markov blanket
particles over time result in a new attracting state in their shared phase space. The
emergence of this new attracting set is just the emergence of a system with a new
NESS (i.e., a new generative model) at the superordinate level—a system that enslaves
the dynamics of Markov blanketed systems at respective subordinate levels.
In providing amodel of the integrated dynamics ofMarkov blankets across different
spatio-temporal scales, the multiscale integration view offers an account of how the
boundaries that compose cognitive systems are mutable, enveloping different com-
ponent parts that contribute to the process of cognition as needed by the cognitive
system. Multiscale integration of living systems that fail to possess the high degree
of autonomy required of adaptive active inference (and hence fail to be cognizers)
continue to engage in mere active inference at fast time scales (e.g., a mitochondrion
in a cell).12 On the other hand, multiscale integration of the nested systems that sub-
11 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point.
12 This is not to suggest thatmitochondria do not exhibit some degree of autonomy and adaptivity. However,
a mitochondrion’s ability to seek out energy gradients required for its continued existence has become
severely limited due to the evolution of the highly dependent relationship between it and its embedding cell.
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tend the scale of a cognizing organism occurs in virtue of hierarchically “downward
reaching” adaptive active inference; the behaviour of constituent nested Markov blan-
ket systems are enslaved to the slower dynamics the autonomous cognizing organism;
the subtending Markov blanketed systems become resources for the cognizing system
to minimize the summated free energy across all nested blankets that compose it.13
This integration in such a case is unidirectional; it is the adaptive active inference at
the slower scale of the cognizing system that drives the continued integration of the
nested Markov blankets at scales below it and not vice versa. Similarly, multiscale
integration between cognizers and non-living artefacts (e.g., spiders and their webs)
may be construed in a similar fashion. Such integration is unidirectionally driven; it
is the active inference dynamics of the biological cognizer that drives integration with
the non-living Markov blanked system and not vice versa.
This sets up the question which will occupy us for the remainder of this paper:
what happens when the component parts of a biological system are themselves highly
autonomous biological systems that engage in adaptive active inference? In other
words, what happens in the case where integration involves physiological individuals
that are cognizers in their own right? Whatever answering this question asks for,
it most certainly requires something more than mere unidirectional integration. It
requires a kind of reciprocal integration that I will argue undergirds the transition
from a collection of cognizing physiological individuals to a symbiotic mind.
However, before presenting this account of reciprocal integration, it is important to
understand just what kind of natural case in the world that the notion of a symbiotic
mind might apply to. So, let us briefly look at one particular striking example of a
symbiotic association: V. fischeri and bobtail squid symbiosis.
3 Vibrio-squid symbiosis: a case study
The Hawaiian bobtail squid Eurprymna scolopes is a nocturnal predator of the shal-
low reef of the Hawaiian archipelago that rests, buried in the sands, during the day
and hunts at night (McFall-Ngai 2008). It is also prey to various marine predators.
Whether or not it is preyed upon, however, is influenced by its association with bio-
luminescent bacteria Vibrio fischeri. The juvenile squid recruits V. fischeri into the
epithelial-lined crypt spaces of its light organ by entraining seawater into itself with
ciliated appendages (Nyholm andMcFall-Ngai 2004) Subsequently the host promotes
its colonization by V. fischeri and only V. fischeri via the production of mucus (i.e.,
bacteria food), the elimination of competing bacteria through hemocyte defences of
its innate immune system (McAnulty and Nyholm 2017) and the eventual shedding of
the ciliated appendages and the swelling of the crypt membranes preventing further
entry into the light organ.14 Following gradients of chitin which they feed upon, V.
fischeri migrate deeper into the crypts of the light organ, colonizing it, and causing
13 Inferring from large scale to small scale thus recapitulates the kind of adaptive active inference which
would drive organogenesis (or morphogenesis) (see Friston et al. 2015).
14 The squid is able to control the amount of light emitted by its light organ by both contraction and
expansion of the ink sac diverticula and by withholding oxygen to the Vibrio colonies which limits the
amount of light the bacteria produce (McFall-Ngai 2008).
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(after reaching a sufficiently high density) a biochemical reaction resulting in their
emission of bioluminescent light. This occurs just in time for the bobtail’s nightly
hunt for prey. Because of the counterillumination against the light of the moon and
stars that the bioluminescence allows, the squid casts no shadow and is thus camou-
flaged from potential predators on the seafloor below it whilst it hunts (McFall-Ngai
and Montgomery 1990; Jones and Nishiguchi 2004). The bacteria also benefit from
the bioluminescent reaction. The process consumes oxygen and induces hypoxic con-
ditions in the squid’s crypts that bring about the exocytosis of cytoplasmic substances
out of the epithelial membrane (Visick and McFall-Ngai 2000). It is hypothesized
that bioluminescence results in the production of nutrients for V. fischeri (Visick and
McFall-Ngai 2000).
The particular population of V. fischeri that inhabit the light organ of the squid is,
however, temporary. For the bobtail, cued by the light of dawn, vents up to 95% of the
bacteria every morning (Nyholm andMcFall-Ngai 2004). During the day, as the squid
rests in the sand, V. fischeri that have not been expelled reproduce, repopulating the
crypts so that by evening their density is high enough for the biochemical reaction that
results in bioluminescence to occur again. After the initial colonization, this bacterial
venting-repopulating cycle continues for the extent of the squid’s life.
3.1 Philosophical implications of Vibrio-squid symbiosis
There are three philosophical implications that are exposed by this striking association
that are significant to the account of symbiotic minds which follows. Firstly, the Vib-
rio-squid association is a clear example of a symbiotic physiological individual. What
makes this association a symbiotic physiological individual opposed to a collection
of physiological individuals? When deploying either an immunological criterion of
physiological individuals (Pradeu 2011) and/or a metabolic criterion of physiological
individuals (Godfrey-Smith 2013), given the high degree of immunological and/or
metabolic functional integration between each symbiont, the Vibrio-squid association
qualifies as a symbiotic physiological individual.15 But does the fact that the assem-
blage is temporary (i.e., that some of the Vibrio are expelled everyday) present a
challenge to the status of the Vibrio-squid association as a symbiotic physiological
individual? Does this daily expelling suggest that a proliferation of symbiotic individ-
uals? This brings into relief a second crucial philosophical implication: physiological
individuals are matters of degree; over time the same living system can be more or
less of a (symbiotic) physiological individual (Bouchard 2018).
The last important philosophical implication may be thrown into relief when asking
the critical questionwhat is it that produces the bioluminescence—the squid, the bacte-
15 The immune criterion emphasizes (in)tolerance to elementswith both exogenous and endogenous origin-
s––relative to the system in question––as necessary for the kind of functional integration that a physiological
individual requires. The metabolic criterion holds that a physiological individual must minimally possess
its own core metabolic machinery (i.e., the machinery that result in processes of energy harvesting and
energy breakdown). This machinery may also include external machinery (other environmental realizers)
which regularly and closely influence those metabolic core processes. For considerations in favour of the
metabolic criterion see Dupre andO’Malley (2009) andGodfrey-Smith (2013, 2014). For a detailed account
of the physiological criterion see Pradeu (2011, 2016).
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ria, or the temporary assemblage of these organisms? Fredric Bouchard (2018) argues
that the bioluminescence is an emergent property of the Vibrio-squid assemblage. His
reasoning is based upon the following facts about this case of bioluminescence. V.
fischeri only begin to emit light when they sense a high concentration of autoinducers
(i.e., a bacterial metabolic product) in the surroundingmedium of the crypt (Miller and
Bassler 2001). This process of quorum sensing induces the transcription of the lux gene
that results in the bacterial bioluminescent light emission (Nyholm and McFall-Ngai
2004). Although V. fischeri populations in the seawaters could grow to such density
as to quorum sense and generate light independently of the squid, V. fischeri do not
actually do this in the wild (Bouchard 2018). The light organ provides just the right
conditions (i.e., shelter and food) for exponential population growth (McFall-Ngai
2008) required of quorum sensing. The bobtail, similarly, cannot generate light itself
without being colonized by V. fischeri. If this is correct, then it is not either the squid
or V. fischeri that glow alone but rather “what glows is a temporary assemblage of
species interacting in the right way” (Bouchard 2018, p. 190).
With this case study and these philosophical implications in mind, let us now return
to the notion of reciprocal multiscale integration and to ultimately answering the
question of how such a symbiotic physiological individual could be a symbiotic mind.
4 Unidirectional versus reciprocal multiscale integration
To understand what is meant by reciprocal integration, I will now contrast it with
unidirectional integration. Tomake this contrast apparent I will deploy the terminology
of users, Ui, and resources, Ri. Users are those living systems, the internal states of
which inferentially generate subpersonal predictions that allow them to use other
Markov blanketed systems that are external to them. A necessary characteristic of
users is that they have the capacity to engage in adaptive active inference and use
Markov blanketed systems that are external to them in order to minimize long-term
free energy. Where being external is relative to the Markov blankets that play an
essential role to the user’s autonomous self-evidencing. Resources, on the other hand,
are those external Markov blanketed systems that given their structure and behaviour
provide a means for users to minimize their long-term free energy but are themselves
not required for autonomous self-evidencing. Importantly, resources can, but need
not, have the capacity to engage in adaptive active inference; they can but need not be
enriched enough so as to qualify as cognizers according to FEP. As such, a Markov
blanketed system can be both a user and a resource.
In unidirectional multiscale integration, the internal states of U1 generate pre-
dictions about the role that R1 plays (e.g., sensory, internal or active state) in a
superordinate level Markov blanket in which it also plays a role. In order to mini-
mize short-term free energy that results from such predictions, U1 acts in ways to
bring about the kind of feedback that would result were it the case that both it and
R1 played those inferred roles. On the other hand, R1 does not (and perhaps cannot)
generate predictions about U1. In contrast, reciprocal multiscale integration describes
the process whereby a user, U1, is simultaneously a resource, R2, for a distinct user,
U2, that is itself a cognitive resource R1 for U1 (see Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2 Unidirectional multiscale integration vs reciprocal multiscale integration: Plate a illustrates small/fast
scale to large/slow scale unidirectional integration. It is unidirectional in terms of being driven by an
inferential procedure, the source of which is the user and not the resource. Here R1 is used by (represented
by the arrow) a prediction generating cognizer U1 but is not itself a cognizer (i.e., although R1 has a
Markov blanket, it does not engage in adaptive active inference). Plate b illustrates reciprocal integration
from small/fast scale to large/slow scale and vice versa. It occurs when users, U1 and U2, are each bio-
cognizers and inferentially generate predictions about the sensory states that would be encountered were
they playing different roles in the same larger Markov blanketed system. Resources, R1 and R2, are used by
U2 and U1 respectively as the users engage in adaptive active inference, adapting their generative models
to one another. Because U1 is R2 and U2 is R1, the integration between the users is reciprocal
U1 generates inferences about the role that R2 plays in a larger Markov blanket that
it also plays a role in, and U2 does the same with respect to R1. U1 acts as a resource
contributing to the adaptive active inference of U2 and vice versa such that from the
increasingly coupled state space of U1 and U2 a new shared (U1/R2 + U2/R1) NESS
density emerges at the superordinate scale, enslaving bothU1 andU2.Anewgenerative
model emerges that not only encodes priors about the ‘preferred’ states of U1 and U2,
but also encodes priors concerning the kinds of environmental conditions in which
the superordinate level unit thrives in addition to the kinds of actions which bring
these conditions about. The result of reciprocal integration is an extended symbiotic
phenotype that authors the conditions for its own existence; by behaving in ways that
optimize action, sampling the world that it expects, the integrated symbiotic unit tends
to provide evidence for its own generative model.16
To be clear, each constituent bio-cognizer continues to engage in adaptive active
inference, acting in ways that ensure it remains statistically separate from its environ-
ment. That two individuals are enslaved by a state attractor at the superordinate scale
does not imply that they must renounce their autonomy to the degree of forfeiting their
status as bio-cognizers. Symbiosis is an effective means of cooperatively sustaining
the Markov blankets of both U1/R2 and U2/R1 separately and as a unit. Importantly,
16 This kind of reciprocal multiscale integration between two (or more) cognizing systems may be inter-
estingly interpreted as a form of niche construction (Constant et al. 2018; Veissière et al. 2019), whereby
U1 and U2, co-evolve and come to play the role of exo-genetically inherited (i.e., non-genetically speci-
fied) resources for each other. Inheritance, spanning long enough timescales, becomes consolidated in the
emergence of a new (U1/R2 + U2/R1) NESS density at the superordinate level. I would like to thank an
anonymous reviewer for bringing this insightful interpretation of reciprocal multiscale integration to my
attention.
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the integration of U1/R2 and U2/R1 into a unit determines a new shared Markov blan-
ket where external states are defined by everything that is not (U1/R2 + U2/R1). It is
the unit which infers the states external to its blanket, differentially interacting with
them in order to persist as a unit. Crucially, the manner in which (U1/R2 + U2/R1)
interacts with its environment cannot be reduced to the differential operations at the
level U1/R2 and U2/R1. It is when they are reciprocally integrated that an emergent
action capacity arises. This is a capacity possessed by a unit to behave in a manner
which outstrips the combined individual behavioural capacities of each user. I would
like to suggest that such an emergent action capacity is evidence that adaptive active
inference is occurring at the level of the symbiotic physiological individual.17 In other
words, when the reciprocal integration of symbiont partners that have been evolu-
tionarily (i.e., adaptively) coerced into following a long-term reciprocal free energy
minimizing strategy do result in an emergent action capacity, this capacity is possessed
by a symbiotic cognizer.
To be sure, an emergent action capacity is a property of the reciprocally integrated
(U1/R2 +U2/R1) unit that constrains and affects the behaviour of the symbiont compo-
nents U1/R2 and U2/R1. As such, how symbiotic cognizers and their action capacities
arise is best characterized as a form of ontological emergence. Ontological emergence
refers to two joint ideas: (1) some properties possessed by a composite macro-level
system cannot be reduced to the structural (i.e., intrinsic) properties of its component
parts and their governing micro-dynamics and (2) because of these new irreducible
properties, a macro-level system has ontological status (e.g., is an entity) in its own
right. (Santos 2015). Such emergent properties at the macro-level are more than the
properties of their component parts in the sense that macro-level properties have causal
powers that their component parts fail to possess, enabling a macro-level system to
both facilitate and constrain the very micro-level parts and dynamics that give rise
to it—what is referred to as ‘downward causation’. Taking into account however that
both new environmental influences are specific to each hierarchical level (Gilbert and
Sarkar 2000) and that causation involved in ontological emergence is diachronic (i.e.,
macro-levels of a system affect micro-levels and vice versa at different sequential
timesteps) (see O’Connor and Wong 2005) emergence may be more accurately––and
less mysteriously––analysed in terms of circular causation.18,19 In fact, this circu-
lar causation should be expected in FEP given an understanding of the kind coupled
dynamic exchanges between self-organizing open systems and their external milieu
that are required for such systems to resist dispersive effects. That is, because system
(U1/R2 + U2/R1) is causally coupled to its environment in a way that neither U1/R2
or U2/R1 are individually, (U1/R2 + U2/R1) has causal powers that neither U1/R2 or
17 The emergence of an action capacity is distinct from the realization of an emergent action capacity. For
example, although I may not be able to do 20 push-ups now after a long workout at the gym, I certainly still
have the capacity to do so when I am rested.
18 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify more about the notion of emergence
being used in this paper.
19 The contemporary notions of emergence are both various and nuanced (see for example Winning and
Bechtel 2019). Although providing a more detailed analysis of the kind of emergence involved in reciprocal
multiscale integration is an interesting and valuable philosophical endeavour, for reasons of limited space,
the more general description of ontological emergence will have to do for the purposes of this paper.
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U2/R1 possess individually. The emergent system has action capacities that, via facil-
itating free-energy minimizing exchanges with its environment at the superordinate
scale, constrain the behaviour of components U1/R2 and U2/R1 at subordinate scales.
Let us now concretize this somewhat abstract description of how reciprocal inte-
gration might occur at the level of the symbiotic unit and return to the case study of
the Vibrio-bobtail squid association.20
4.1 Vibrio-squid reciprocal integration
The squid-Vibrio reciprocal integrationmight unfold as follows: the internal states ofV.
fischeri, U1 and those of the bobtail system, U2, come to generate the same inferences
about the sensory effects that should be observed were both of the to play the role
of sensory and active states in a superordinate blanketed system. For example, both
U1 and U2 might expect sensory feedback in the form of a reduced ambient oxygen
gradient in the bobtail’s light organ (i.e., an increased hypoxic state). The squid system,
in order to reduce the free energy that arises as result of its inferences, acts to bring
about that very pattern of protracted feedback that it expects. To do this, the squid
harvests V. fischeri, R2, and only V. fischeri and thereafter provides conditions for their
thriving from which these protracted sensory patterns may arise. When all goes well,
reducing free-energy associated with the expected hypoxia allows the squid system to
further influence the evolving states of its light organ; these evolving light organ states
reflect the evolution of two convergent flows on a shared squid-Vibrio state space.
Similarly, in order to reduce the free-energy that arises from the Vibrio system’s
inferences about expected sensory states, the bacteria migrate further into deep crypts
of the light organ, shed their flagella (reducing a degree of their own autonomy), and
bring about a decreasing ambient oxygen gradient over time as both their density and
quorum sensing increases. In this reciprocal manner, the generative models of the
squid and V. fischeri adapt to one another, each user acting as a free-energy mini-
mizing resource for the other. Crucially, as a result of the continued and increasing
squid-Vibrio coupled activity, a new attractor emerges at a superordinate scale on their
shared state space. This emergentNESSdensity corresponds to a newgenerativemodel
that is distinct from the squid and Vibrio models that gave rise to it. Thus, by recip-
rocally behaving in ways to bring about the kinds of feedback that would accompany
their inferred roles in a superordinate Markov blanketed system, U1 and U2 integrate
across spatio-temporal scales, harvesting evidence for an emergent phenotype (U1/R2
+ U2/R1). (See Fig. 3). Via its influence upon the environment, this new symbiotic
bio-cognitive individual both constrains and facilitates the continued behaviour of its
component users and realizers.
The notion of environmental influence may be understood in terms of the effects
of an emergent action capacity that is a property of the symbiotic bio-cognizer and
20 The description of symbiotic cognitive integration that follows is admittedly simplified in that I shall
treat the V. fischeri colony as a single individual. Vibrio-squid symbiosis, although only involving two
species, involves more than two organisms (e.g., a colony of Vibrio may reach 109 inside the light organ of
a bobtail). Moreover, given that scale refers to spatio-temporal scale, on intuitive grounds I will stipulate
that the V. fischeri system and the bobtail system live at different scales; the former, being smaller and faster,
is nested in the latter.
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Fig. 3 Reciprocal multiscale integration: the squid system, U1/R2, infers (indicated by the wavy arrows) that
V. fischeri system, U2/R1, plays the role of sensory states (indicated by yellow nodes) and that it plays the
role of active states (indicated by orange nodes) in a superordinate level Markov blanketed system (U1/R2
+ U2/R1). U1/R2, becomes further coupled to the dynamics of U2/R1, actively bringing about the kind
of sensory feedback that would accompany each of the subordinate level system’s playing its respective
inferred role in the larger blanket. Similarly, the V. fischeri system, U2/R1, integrates with the squid system
by inferring that U1/R2, plays the role of the active states and that it plays the role of sensory states in
(U1/R2 + U2/R1). U2/R1, then acts in ways to bring about the kinds of sensory feedback that would be
observed were the two systems to play these inferred roles. The bacteria (user) system does this by engaging
in tightly coupled behaviour with the squid(resource) system. This reciprocal integration over time results
in the emergence of a new NESS density, the dynamics of which enslave those of U1/R2 and U2/R1. The
resulting global emergent action capacity possessed by the symbiotic unit (U1/R2 + U2/R1) allows for a
downwards causal influence upon those very systems which give rise to it. Modified from Kirchhoff et al.
(2018). (Color figure online)
not of its component parts. More precisely, as U1 and U2 become further integrated,
flowing towards the new squid-Vibrio NESS density, the new system acquires a new
action capacity, controlled bioluminescence, that only reaching maturation, is actual-
ized nightly at the peak of integration.
This reveals a crucial point: Markov blanket integration (reciprocal and unidirec-
tional) as located in FEP is amatter of degree. That this is the case is implied by the fact
thatMarkov blankets can bemore or less integrated over time and that integration does
not happen instantaneously but is something that can increase (and decrease). The spi-
der system that rebuilds its web after being forced to relocate to a different location is
likely to integrate with its newly constructedweb to a high degree only after interacting
with it; this a process where internal states of the spider system calibrate to the sensory
feedback that arises as external states (e.g., wind, prey, its own actions) affect the web
(i.e., the resource). Integration between the bobtail and V. fischeri systems is a rolling
diel process (i.e., a cyclical process that occurs over the course of a 24-h period). For
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subsequent to the initial colonization, reciprocal integration peaks nightly with the
emergence of controlled bioluminescence. This high degree of integration lasts until
the symbiotic bio-cognitive individual that is evidenced by the emergent action capac-
ity expels 95% of the Vibrio back into the water when cued by the first light of dawn.
At this point the integration drops in degree to its lowest value of the diel cycle and
the process of reciprocal integration begins anew from this lower degree until the unit,
with the emergent bioluminescence, actively generates evidence for its own existence
again.
Does this drop in the degree of integration that accompanies the diel cycle result in a
problem of proliferating bio-cognitive individuals; short-lived individuals that spring
into existence nightly and are the cause of their own dissipation at each dawn venting?
I would like to argue that this problem is may be avoided when it is recognized that
being a bio-cognitive individual is a matter of degree.21 Even when the squid-Vibrio
unit is not integrated enough to realize its capacity for controlled bioluminescence
(by its glowing and using it), this does not mean that the squid-Vibrio unit is not
integrated enough to possess the capacity. The long-lived bio-cognitive squid-Vibrio
unit, through a continuous process of adaptive active inference retains this capacity
and when enough free energy is minimized in the reciprocal integration process, the
symbiotic unit may deploy the capacity. This suggests that when the capacity for
controlled bioluminescence is not realized, the symbiotic unit is less of a bio-cognitive
individual rather than losing its status full stop (See Fig. 4).
This kind of ebb and flow of the degree of cognitive individuality is familiar in our
own case. For although when sleeping we fail to use our capacities to fully engage
in the kind of self-evidencing active inference, we remain bio-cognizers. What I am
suggesting is that in such cases we may be bio-cognizers to a lesser degree. Moreover,
the daily expelling of the Vibrio may be seen itself as an instance of self-evidencing
of the integrated symbiotic cognizer! For if the Vibrio were not vented, the existence
of the unit would be at risk. Venting is an active way of fostering a condition in which
Vibrio quorum sensing will continue effectively in the future by keeping Vibrio in an
active growth phase (Visick andMcFall-Ngai 2000). As such venting on the part of the
symbiotic unit may be construed in terms of actively reducing expected free energy.
Moreover, venting prevents the symbiotic association from becoming harmful to the
squid (too high of a Vibrio density over a long period may result in Vibrio bringing
about pathogenic responses).
If this picture of reciprocal integration of the squid and Vibrio is correct, then the
Vibrio-squid physiological individual via reciprocal multiscale integration becomes
a model of its niche; a model that is different from that of its individual symbionts.
Both the existence of the symbiotic cognizer and the pattern of controlled biolu-
minescent masking that occurs over the course of night is evidence for the specific
range of environmental conditions that have evolutionarily come to have Vibrio-squid-
association-relative value. Expressing this point deploying the ecological notion of
21 This solution is consistent with the idea that a being a physiological individual is a matter of degree
(Queller and Strassman 2009; Godfrey-Smith 2014; Bouchard 2016); the degree of physiological individ-
uality is proportional to the degree of functional integration. As such, then although after the venting of
the Vibrio the squid-Vibrio association is less of physiological individual it is still functionally integrated
(metabolically and/or immunologically) enough to retain its status as a physiological individual.
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Fig. 4 The diel cycle of Vibrio-squid integration and bio-cognitive individuality
affordances (Gibson 1979), while the moonlit waters of the Hawaiian reef may afford
safety for the integrated Vibrio-squid association, it fails to offer an affordance of this
sort to either of the lone symbionts.
To sum up: I have argued that a symbiotic unit (e.g., Vibrio-squid association) that
is constituted of cognizing symbionts at different scales may itself be a biological
cognizing system when the symbiont partners that compose it engage in a high degree
of reciprocal integration, a form of Markov blanket integration that falls out FEP. If
what I have argued is correct, it is possible that in some restricted cases symbionts
can maintain their status as bio-cognizers whilst simultaneously giving rise to a new
NESS density that corresponds to a symbiotic cognizing individual in its own right.
5 Conclusion
I began this paper by flagging a particular concern that arises when considering the
notion of a symbiotic mind. The idea that cognizers may have other cognizers as
nested constituent parts is an idea that seems to run counter to our folk-psychological
intuitions about what it is to be a cognizer. This concern I noted reiterates a simi-
lar worry for the physiological account of biological individuality: the hierarchically
nested ontology of physiological individuals in physiological individuals flouts out
folk-biological intuition that an organism cannot be a constituent of another organ-
ism.22 This worry for the physiological account can be defanged however by pointing
22 See S. Chauvier’s (2017) “the formal indivisibility principle” for an expression of this concern which is
also called “the exclusion principle” (Godfrey-Smith 2014).
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out that physiological individuals are distinct from Darwinian individuals (i.e., units
of reproduction) and that it is the nesting of the latter that is intuitively problematic.23
As such, folk-biological intuitions cannot be used when adjudicating the claim that
physiological individuals can be nested in other physiological individuals in symbi-
otic associations (Godfrey-Smith 2014). With this in mind, I would like to suggest that
the worry that cognizers cannot be nested in other cognizers may stem from a simi-
lar failure on behalf of folk-psychology to distinguish physiological individuals from
Darwinian individuals, overlooking the former. For if our folk-psychology implicitly
models the notion of cognizers upon that of Darwinian individuals––a much more sci-
entifically old and ingrained conception of biological individuals––then it would seem
that the notion of nested cognizers would remain as unintuitive as the notion of nested
Darwinian individuals. However, by reconceptualizing our folk-psychological notion
of “cognizer” to include physiological individuals the notion of nested biological cog-
nizers is no more unintuitive as that of nested physiological individuals. Moreover,
given that the conception of cognizers as physiological individuals is already implicit
in FEP, this framework and its corollary active inference (mere and adaptive), offer an
ideal programme for bringing our folk-psychological intuitions in line with the way
nature has carved its own joints over evolutionary timescales.
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